



February 13, 2007

Dear Assembly Member,

During the learning phase, members were introduced to the major families of electoral systems. These families which we categorized as Plurality (First past the post, block vote and single non-transferable vote); Majority Family (Two-Round System and Alternative Vote); Proportional Family (List Proportional Representation and Single Transferable Vote); Mixed Family (Mixed Member Proportional and Parallel) make up all the electoral systems used in democratic countries around the world today.

In our consultation phase, we heard from many who recommended variations of these families. We also heard several unique systems not presently used in any nation to elect politicians. Since these were not discussed in the learning phase and are not included in the texts we used, George and I thought that it would be useful to create a document that summarizes each of them in the authors' own words. It is attached to this letter.

Should a group of you want to consider any of these models, as one of the two alternative models we design, we will have an opportunity to consider that after we have designed a first alternative in weekend two.

If you have any questions about these systems, please do not hesitate to get in touch with me or any member of the learning team.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Jonathan Rose".

Jonathan Rose
Academic Director



Alternative Systems presented during the Public Consultation Phase

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Section A: Approval Voting

One Candidate - One Vote" versus "One Man - One Vote

Name: James Ronback

Approval Voting is a voting procedure in which each voter can vote for as many candidates that are acceptable for a given local seat. Each candidate approved of receives one vote and the candidate with the most votes wins.

Approval Voting has the following advantages:

- it has more flexible options.
- it elects the strongest candidate.
- it reduces negative campaigning.
- it is not susceptible to 'strategic voting'.
- it more accurately reflects minority candidates percentage of popular support
- it increases voter turnout.
- it has a simple counting process.
- it allows citizens to verify the counts at home without a computer
- it does not need multiple voting rounds
- it is easy to modify voting machines to accommodate approval voting.

The voting results can be simply accumulated and displayed in real-time progressively from each polling station. This stands in contrast to STV and MMP, where the winners and losers cannot be safely predicted and reported until all the votes are counted from all the polling stations to allow the transfers to be then calculated.

The candidate with the broadest approval base wins- that is, centrists not extremists get elected. Generally, the candidate who won under approval voting did well amongst voters who only voted for one candidate as well as those who voted for more than one candidate. Approval voting is used by several national and international societies in their election of officers. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is selected by approval voting.

Ontario citizens need Approval Voting.

For more information, see Submission #1159.

Approval Voting

Name: Allan Hall

Using approval voting, voters are allowed to vote for as many candidates as they wish, instead of being restricted to supporting only one candidate. The ballot paper would remain as it is now, and voters would continue to mark their choices with an "X". Electors can vote for one, two, or up to as many candidates as are on the ballot, or even leave their ballot blank. The winning candidate would continue to be the one receiving the most votes; however, he or she would also be the one whose candidacy is approved by the greatest number of voters.

In practice, approval voting has been used recently by the United Nations to elect the new Secretary General.

There are several advantages to using Approval Voting. It is simple and understandable. There is no need to change riding boundaries or implement complex voting or counting procedures. Only two sections of the *Election Act* would need to be amended: s.48(1) "Casting vote" and s.57(2) "What may be accepted as valid ballot".

Approval voting is flexible and can be used in conjunction with the Single Member Plurality system, and can also be used to elect riding MPPs in a Mixed-Member Proportional system. Approval voting increases the legitimacy of elected MPPs and will also increase the number of votes cast for winning candidates- although it may not guarantee majority support. However, elected members would carry the broadest endorsement possible of the voters in their riding, and would more truly represent the wishes of their constituents. It provides greater choice for voters and would nullify 'strategic voting', since voters are not limited to supporting a single candidate. Minor party candidates would receive their 'true' level of support, since voters could choose to vote for every party they wished.

Approval voting is the preferred method of voting for the most diverse electorate in the world, the United Nations. Ontario could pioneer its use in a larger jurisdiction.

Approval voting is a promising alternative that should be considered by the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform.

For more information, see Submission 1577.

Approval Voting

Name: David Graham

The two greatest weaknesses of the current electoral system are its over-reliance on political parties and the limitation that a single vote provides. A fair voting system exists which does not constrict voters to one vote. For example, if I would be perfectly happy with three of the six candidates seeking the seat in my riding, I should be free to vote for all three of them.

Approval Voting provides this capacity. As in FPTP, the person who receives the most votes wins. However, voters may vote for as many candidates as they choose, producing a result where the most widely approved candidate becomes the winner.

Approval Voting is very simple and our existing electoral infrastructure and ballots need not be changed. Each voter selects all of the candidates on the ballot whom they would feel comfortable representing them. As is the case now, the candidate with the most votes is declared the winner, and representation continues as it always has. This simple change nullifies the age-old Canadian problem of strategic voting and empowers the people.

My submission contains more information on, and arguments for, the Approval Voting system as well as arguments against the more popular but less productive Proportional Representation system.

For more information, see Submission 1691.

Approval Voting with Cluster Seats

Name: Chris Bradshaw

Approval Voting with Cluster Seats is a unique system which could become Ontario's gift to the democratic world. It consists of the following:

- * The total number of seats is divided up: for example, 2/3 are local constituency seats and 1/3 are "cluster seats" determined by recycling 'unused' votes.
- * Ballots allow voters to mark as many candidates as they want (including marking all or marking none). Each mark counts as an "approval" by the voter.
- * The local seat is awarded to the candidates with the most 'approvals,' but only if that candidate is approved by a majority of those casting ballots. Seats in constituencies that don't meet the majority criteria become – until the next general election – a "cluster" seat.
- * Approval votes not used to determine the winner go into the provincial 'pot,' including approval votes for those not winning, as well as for winning candidates who exceeded the majority criterion.
- * Elections Ontario divides the 'pot' among the 'unused' approvals, after adding to the cluster seats those local seats that could not be awarded, due to the lack of a majority for any of the candidates. Each party then divides the constituencies they did *not* win into the number of geographically contiguous (regional) clusters equal to the number of cluster seats they earned. Elections Ontario then names that party's constituency candidate in that cluster of constituencies that had the highest percentage of approvals in their own race.

The result is that voters have a local MLA for their constituency *and* a cluster MLA for each party whose candidate they approved of. There are no province-wide MLAs or double ballots (e.g., MMP).

Section B: Condorcet Systems

The Condorcet System

Name: Lucien Saumur

There is only one thing wrong with our Single-Member Plurality System and it is that, when there are more than two candidates in the running, it does not always lead to the election of the candidates preferred by the majority of the voters, as befits an electoral system in a democracy. The consequence of this outcome is that the elected individuals represent political parties rather than the voters.

Any form of proportionality would only worsen this situation. What is needed, rather, is a system that would empower the voters.

The Condorcet system will achieve this purpose. This system has the following attributes:

- requires the use of the preferential ballot;
- views an election as a set of two-candidate sub-elections where each candidate competes against every other candidate, on a one-to-one basis;
- the candidate who emerges as preferred to all others, in every sub-election in which he or she is a party, is logically recognized as the candidate who deserves to be declared elected.

The Condorcet system must not be seen as an independent system. It is the Single-Member Plurality System *corrected* so as to elect the preferred candidate, however many candidates are in the running. It does not require a change of district magnitude. It may easily be implemented thanks to modern technology.

I am convinced that the people of Ontario are weary of having to vote strategically and would welcome a system that would empower them by allowing them to express themselves easily, honestly and thoroughly, when they go to the polls.

For more information, see Submission #'s 1426, 1182, 1028, 1001.

Condorcet single-winner election method and a Condorcet STV method

Name: Markus Schulze

In the first part of the longer submission (submission # 1005), a preferential single-winner election method (the “Schulze method”) is proposed which satisfies the following criteria:

- majority for solid coalitions
- independence of clones
- monotonicity
- resolvability
- reversal symmetry
- Condorcet criterion

Proponents of Alternative Voting ignore that it violates monotonicity, reversal symmetry, and the Condorcet criterion; while those supporting the Kemeny-Young method (see submission #1580) ignore that it violates independence of clones.

The Schulze method is the only Condorcet method that is used on a wider range.

Today’s most serious problem of multi-winner elections is their vulnerability to “free riding” strategies and “vote management” strategies.

A “free rider” is a voter who misuses the fact that, in multi-winner elections, it is a useful strategy *not* to vote for a candidate who is certain of being elected even without one’s vote.

“Vote management” is a strategy where a party asks its supporters to vote preferably for those of its candidates who are less assured of election. In fact, all single transferable vote (STV) proportional representation systems display instances of this strategic problem.

In the second part of the longer submission the Schulze STV method is proposed, where the vulnerability to these strategies is minimized- to its theoretical limit- without losing any of the desirable properties of STV methods.

In the third part, the Schulze STV method is applied to the instances of Tideman’s database.

For more information, see Submission 1005.

Condorcet

Name: Ranpal Dosanjh

Plurality systems like Single-Member Plurality (SMP) and majority systems like Alternative Vote (AV) are often considered as separate electoral systems. However, the real differences between these two systems is simply the method used to determine the winner. This submission argues that Condorcet methods are meant to achieve the same goal: to select the one candidate that best reflects the will of the voting public (usually riding-based). Unlike multi-member systems or proportional systems, the former three systems are easily compared based on how accurately they achieve the goal of accurately translating votes into seats.

We can compare how well SMP, AV, and Condorcet counting methods achieve their goal in light of the values expressed by the Assembly. Condorcet methods more legitimately represent the will of the population than does AV, and are also much easier to execute from a poll worker's perspective than AV. Therefore, Condorcet methods are superior to AV, and anywhere AV appears in a proposal (as a whole system or as part of a system), the Assembly should seriously consider replacing it with a Condorcet method.

Similarly, Condorcet methods more legitimately represent the will of the population than does SMP, though SMP is a little easier to execute than Condorcet methods from a poll worker's perspective. Therefore, unless easier implementation is an absolutely overriding concern (which is unlikely), Condorcet methods are superior to SMP. Anywhere SMP appears in a proposal, as a whole system or as a part of a system, the Assembly should consider replacing it with a Condorcet method.

For more information, see Submission 1060.

Section C: Forms of Pair-Wise Voting

Pair-Wise Voting

Name: Ralph Anderson

The following is a summary of core aspects of Pair Wise voting with a fair tiebreak.

The Pair Wise ballot lets the voter express equality of preferences. Each voter gets only one X that really counts- i.e., that expresses their primary preference. Pair Wise lets you find the tie between equal preferences. For example, when 2 voters want A, and 2 other voters can't make up their minds between B and C, voters should be allowed to say "B = C." This is an expression of equality of preference.

The first tiebreak that must be decided is between the two groups sharing votes- B and C. In this case, simply flip a coin to decide who loses. This is fair as both B and C have 50% of the undecided votes so either party gets a 50% chance of winning. The survivor keeps those votes and stays in a tie with A. Now the voters can decide between these two parties.

When 4 voters prefer A, 3 voters want B- but would settle for C- and 2 voters prefer C, Approval, FPTP and IRV systems all elect Candidate A.

But I have a question for those 3 supporters of Candidate B: if you knew you were going to lose, is there anyone else you would have voted for first?

Wouldn't it be nice if it could count, as a second preference?

The Pair Wise ballot with fair tiebreaking can do that: in this scenario, there are 5 votes for C, and 4 votes for A.

In Pair Wise, this is a "Smith Set." The Condorcet Method elects C. That's pretty fair. But since we are talking politics, and we want to keep the election honest, it's fairest to let Candidate B decide if this is going to be a minority win for A, or a majority win for C.

For more information, see Submission 1004.

VoteFair Ranking

Author: Richard Fobes

Adopting VoteFair ranking will reduce the gap between what voters want and politicians do.

VoteFair ranking not only reveals which candidate is most popular, it also identifies which candidate is second-most popular, which candidate is third-most popular, and so on down to the least popular.

Using preference ballots the voters indicate their first choice, second choice, third choice, etc. In contrast to other methods using preference ballots, VoteFair ranking imposes no limitations on how a voter can rank the candidates, and this eliminates the issue of spoiled ballots.

VoteFair calculations consider every combination of every candidate in every placement (who is first, who is second, etc.). For each such sequence a score is calculated, and the sequence with the highest score reveals the overall popularity ranking. These calculations are mathematically equivalent to the calculations in the unexplored Kemeny-Young method proposed in 1959.

The calculations also produce pairwise counts which enable any interested voter to verify that the winning candidate is preferred -- by a majority -- over the voter's favorite non-winning candidate.

VoteFair ranking is not vulnerable to vote-splitting or strategic voting, and it meets the majority and Condorcet fairness criteria. In short, it surpasses the fairness of all other voting methods.

In a voter-friendly way VoteFair ranking will reform the fairness of riding-based elections.

If proportional representation is also considered, VoteFair ranking offers fair alternatives for filling the compensatory seats.

For more information, see Submission 1580.

Section D: Reconceptualising Vote Value and Expressions of Preference

Variable Seat Magnitude

Name: Dan Sonke

Variable Seat Magnitude is a mechanism that allows for Proportional Representation **and** Local Accountability without compromise. It eliminates the need for, and the pitfalls of, lists (MMP) and avoids the complexities of STV. This could be considered a new 'family' within the group of electoral systems. Further, it is adaptable to different approaches for calculating proportionality and electing local representatives. This flexibility allows for additional values to be incorporated into the design of the electoral system.

The basic idea is that each **seat** in parliament does not carry the same '**vote weight**'.

The following is a simple example: imagine a parliament with 122 seats which has a "Total Vote Value" of 200 points.

Party A has 49 seats and 37% of the popular vote;

Party B has 41 seats and 46% of the popular vote.

Therefore: Party A gets $200 \text{ points} \times 37\% = 74 \text{ points}$

Party B gets $200 \text{ points} \times 46\% = 92 \text{ points}$

Next, each party's points are distributed equally between their respective seats.

Therefore the 'vote weight' for each seat would be:

Party A gets $74 \text{ points} / 49 \text{ seats} = 1.51 \text{ points per seat}$

Party B gets $92 \text{ points} / 41 \text{ seats} = 2.24 \text{ points per seat}$

Voting in parliament would be based on the total number of points voting for or against and, therefore, each party's 'voice' in parliament carries a 'weight' that is proportional to their percentage of the popular vote.

Please note: Although this submission is the product of independent thought, it is not the first to promote this mechanism. In addition to submission # 1026, a variation of it has been proposed for UN voting reforms.

For more information, see Submission 1471.

The Weighted Vote Electoral Method

Name: John Stillich

The Weighted Vote system achieves PR with a minimum amount of change. Here's how it works:

- Voting at the ballot box remains unchanged, except that all political parties are listed, including those without a district candidate.
- Once all of the votes cast for party candidates are tabulated, the voting power of parties is brought into line with its share of the popular vote, by awarding additional votes— not additional members —to each MPP whose parties were 'short-changed' in the election, based on their party's share of the popular vote.

For example, if Party X receives 15% of the popular vote but wins only 10% of the seats, each MPP for that party would have 1.5 votes in the Legislature.

- If a party elects no MPPs, but should have voting power according to its share of the popular vote, its leader is awarded a single seat, together with its voting entitlement.

Impacts:

1. The tradition of exactly one vote for each party MPP no longer applies, except for Independent MPPs.
2. The number of seats in the Legislature remains relatively unchanged.
3. Full PR is achieved without district boundary changes, party lists or multiple choice voting.
4. Every vote counts; strategic voting unnecessary.
5. Minor/New parties have a proportionate voice in the Legislature.
6. Demographic representation is improved, without quotas.
7. Representation is not defined by human membership in the Legislature, but by the weight of the votes carried by each party.
8. Every MPP is directly accountable to voters in his/her district.

For more information, see Submission 1026.

Mixed Majority Approval

Name: Marc Fortier

Mixed Majority Approval (MMA) is here proposed as a replacement for the current voting system in Ontario. Under MMA, ballots are split into 2 parts. In the first part, voters are asked to rate each candidate as either "preferred", "acceptable" or "unacceptable".

In the second part, they are asked to indicate the one party they support the most. Candidates with the support of a clear majority of voters in their riding are elected first. In ridings where no candidate has a clear majority, the seats are then filled by compensatory allocation.

Some of the advantages of MMA over the alternatives to FPTP are:

- MMA does not require lists of party candidates. All members are elected in ridings. This prevents party elite from increasing their influence over elected members of their party and eliminates the question of whether list or riding members are more legitimate or should hold more power
- MMA retains strong geographical representation (each elected member is the sole representative of a single specific riding)
- MMA does not require a change in the boundaries of existing ridings nor in the number of seats in the legislature
- MMA is simpler to implement than the alternatives because, as is noted above, fewer things need to be changed

MMA will produce fairer results than those produced by FPTP. Its implementation should increase voter turnout and interest in public policy because it will give voters more choices and will make every voter's choice count.

For more information, see Submission 1391.

Voter Evaluation of Candidates

Name: Bryan Kerman

First-past-the-post voting requires that a voter give all or nothing to one candidate. A preferential/alternate vote asks the voter to rank the candidates but doesn't show how much the voter prefers one to another. The French mixed plurality/preference system requires the voters to vote twice, sometime apart.

A system which has all the advantages of these systems but none of their faults is called 'value voting'. In 'value voting', the voter evaluates the candidates - much like giving a mark on an exam. For example, a voter might give 75 out of 100 to one candidate, 50 to another, 0 to another and 15 to yet another. Each value would be a statement on how well that candidate and party are judged to meet the voter's expectations.

With these values summed over all voters, the proposed new voting process:

1. Produces a majority winner by consensus every time;
2. Needs only one round of voting;
3. Avoids the false tactical voting in the Australian preferential system;
4. Includes all voters as part of the consensus building to select the winning candidate;
5. Stops the compromising of minority party voters and gives them significant power
6. Reduces the confrontation and aggressiveness of the winner-take-all approach currently used in Ontario;
7. Can be extended to the Legislature to defeat an unpopular government who has a majority of seats but not the support of a majority of voters (such a government would be deemed to have only a conditional majority and could be defeated in a special vote of non- confidence using the results from value voting).

The Citizens' Assembly may wish to try this form of voting as it wrestles with how to evaluate its options and make a majority-by-consensus decision.

For more information, see Submission #'s 1477, 1100.

Party Platform Vote

Name: Al Gullon

FPTP has three chronic problems. First, a party can gain a five-year mandate with 30% of the popular vote. Second, there is decreasing voter turnout. Third, the problem of 'wasted votes.'

Under Party Platform Vote, the date for the next election would be fixed by Election Ontario as a function of the percentage of eligible voters voting for the winning party's candidates. I suggest a simple rule: two years with 20% (or less) of the electorate up to the full five years with 50%. Note that I said "latest date"- the Lieutenant Governor would still be able to call an earlier election if the government lost the confidence of the House.

For the second change, we note that most Canadians vote for a party rather than a candidate. This system proposes that, in addition to the current 103 votes in Parliament, there would be up to 100 party platform votes. Each leader would have a block of votes equal in number to the percentage of the eligible electors voting for the party. (Please note that it is percentage of *electors* NOT of those voting.) Only those persons who have a sufficiently large enough body of support would have a voice in parliament, thereby protecting against an excess of smaller parties or independents. It should be noted that this platform vote, for elected parties, also provides a shield against the worst aspect of PR: that is *unelected* persons wielding immense power in a closely divided parliament.

With these simple, no extra cost, electoral changes *every vote cast would count*, whether for a winning candidate or not. Actually your vote would 'count' many times: *immediately* to lengthen (if your party wins) or shorten (if the other guys win) the mandate of the government and then *every time* the leader of *your* party casts the platform vote in the House. Campaign teams, even for losing candidates, would have a simple goal, get out every possible vote ... and would be inspired to fight on even when the local situation was clearly hopeless.

For more information, see Submission 1999.

Section E: Mixed Systems

Additional party votes

Name: John Northey

The core concept is to allow people to vote in two ways on their ballot.

The first vote is for a local MPP, who would be primarily responsible for presenting their local riding's interests to the legislature.

The second vote would be for whichever party the voter feels represents their interests best.

The result of this is a 50-50 split for each vote. All MPP's would vote in Parliament as they currently do. However, once the MPP's have voted, each party leader would then stand and state that their party votes will go for or against the issue at hand. This would allow for the local MPP to vote according to the interests of the local riding, thus ensuring that local riding interests are represented- even if the MPP's vote is at odds with the stance of the party the MPP belongs to.

The party leader votes would be split based on their popular vote percentage throughout the province. Any party getting enough of the popular vote to equal one seat is entitled to the right to sit in the legislature and to vote on all issues.

For example, under this system if the party vote from the last election was the same as the popular vote overall then, under the additional party votes system, in addition to the traditional 3 parties we would have had 'party votes' go to the Green Party (3) and the Family Coalition Party (1). This outcome is based on both parties having over 0.485% of the vote (half of 1/103 of the popular vote, which rounded would provide one seat).

For more information, see Submission # 1021.

The Centered Election System

Name: Yves Villeneuve

The Centered Election System is a 2-vote, 2-member, 2-round, true proportional election system. Not too simple, not too complex.

The district would have a legislative vote value of: district population divided by provincial population, allowing true proportionality for each district in the legislature.

The two candidates with the most votes in the first round would become representatives for the district and move on to the second round. The second round results would determine the proportion of the district vote they will represent when voting on legislation. This allows true proportionality for each member of a district.

As usual, only one candidate per party can run in the district election, thus guaranteeing a government opposition when electing 2 members in each district.

In each round, voters may choose to equally split their 2 votes between two candidates, or cast 1 or 2 votes toward a sole candidate. On the ballot, the candidates are listed by name and party affiliation. In this ballot structure, the voter would be free to cast its two votes based on candidates, party or both- therefore increasing voter choice.

Finally, quotas are the responsibility of political parties. The most distinct groups are males and females. A fair system would have a political party's district association allow males to nominate a prospective male candidate and females to nominate a prospective female candidate. The leader of the party would then choose one candidate to represent its party in the district. The incumbent would safely remain the party's district candidate providing they are nominated.

For more information, see Submission #'s 1581, 1081, 1035, 1033, 1020, 1015, 1007.

The Sudbury- Kaufman Model

Name: Chris Land

The Sudbury-Kaufman model consists of two parts that can be combined for a voting system or can be separated. The first part is the use of multi-vote plurality to elect the Legislative Assembly. The second is the creation of an upper house (Legislative Council) elected using list proportional representation.

Multi-vote plurality (MVP) is similar to single vote plurality except that citizens would be allowed to vote for more than one candidate in a single representative constituency. MVP would produce results similar to preferential balloting or STV because voters aren't limited to a single choice as their representative. However, MVP is much simpler than those other systems because poll workers are still counting all of the votes cast and the single person with the greatest number of votes wins.

MVP changes the question put to voters from, "which candidate would you like to represent you", to "which candidates are acceptable as your representative." Winning candidates would often enjoy majority support from their constituents because MVP allows citizens to vote for their secondary and tertiary preferences. Majority governments would be far more likely to have the support of a majority of Ontarians. MVP would be unique to Ontario.

A proportionally elected Legislative Council would provide a proportional element to the Ontario Legislature but still retain the likelihood of stable majority governments in the Legislative Assembly where the government is chosen. Creating a bicameral legislature for Ontario isn't essential to the value gained from adopting MVP for election of the Legislative Assembly.

For more information, see Submission 1109.

Semi-Presidential Republic-Style Government

Name: William Cawston

Currently, citizens elect representatives to represent local constituencies. However, with the power of our governments increasingly centralized in the executive (i.e., cabinet and the premier), local MPP's are expected to toe the party line and cannot represent their constituents. Furthermore, the executive is only accountable to its party. The power of the executive is determined based on the votes of a small percentage of the population and by partisan politics.

Currently, we get one vote for two effects: our local representative, and our executive. In order to allow people to properly indicate their desires in governance, we need to separate these two effects.

I propose a semi-presidential-republic style government. Local MPP's continue to be elected as they are: the only difference is how the executive is chosen. Each candidate for Chairman of the Executive Council campaigns with a list of registered candidates to fill the Council.

The individual chosen as Chairman will choose the Executive Council, with the composition based on the percentage he and his opponents received. The Council will be the subject of the first vote of parliament, and shall be a vote of confidence. Changes to the Council shall always be subject to the next possible vote in parliament, and votes shall always be votes of confidence. Alternatively, parliament, parliamentary committees, or individual MPP's can call for dismissals in the Council, and an appropriate majority vote on the issue shall be binding.

By removing the executive from parliament, (forbidding the executive from introducing new laws), local MPPs can be relieved from partisan politics and represent their constituents.

For more information, see Submission 1306.

Cumulative Majority Preferential/Proportional

Name: Dave Brekke

The goals of this system are: to increase voter participation; increase functional representative democracy; increase a sense of community; and increase opportunities for positive citizen participation in representative democracy.

This system would make the transition from FPTP relatively easy by introducing preferential voting. The result of preferential voting would be riding MPP's elected with 50%+ of the electorates' support- a positive change which would increase the legitimacy of the system.

This system would also allow voters to see the effect their votes have on the formation of the legislature. The make-up of the legislature itself would change by incorporating 87 Preferential riding seats; 20 Proportional paired riding seats; and 23 additional Proportional Area Seats, resulting in a legislature with 130 total Seats, 33% of which are proportional.

Political parties would still play an important role, continuing to run representatives throughout Ontario, but they would have less power.

This system would result in a very high probability of minority governments and would also demand increased collaboration between parties in terms of policies and programs.

Many citizens, both rural and urban, have expressed concern about electoral reform having a negative effect on rural representation and the loss of connection to their elected representative. This mixed system achieves proportionality + majoritarianism + local representation + simplicity. It is unique.

For more information, see Submission #'s 1592 and 1591.

Mixed Urban/Rural System

Name: William Pickett

Ontario should adopt a mixed system of rural areas where a riding and a district are the same, and multimember urban areas where there are both districts and ridings. This would reflect Ontario's extreme variations in population density.

The ballot would contain two parts. The first part would be used to elect the local district member using a Single Transferable Vote [STV] system.

The second part of the ballot would contain a list of officially recognized parties and would also address the issue of Proportional Representation [PR]. The voter would vote for the party of his or her choice (the issue of including Independents can be debated as well). The direct PR candidates would be elected using a system of PR, but with PR as a 'top up' to those elected as local members. The second half of the ballot would be identical through-out the province. In order for a PR candidate to win, they would need to "win" in each local urban district as well as overall in the province. This would address the underrepresentation of smaller parties.

This system would require creating urban districts for the PR tier based on an amalgamation of current ridings primarily located in the most densely populated areas- Southern Ontario and the Ottawa region.

This system would increase legitimacy as it would retain local representatives while being more representative of the popular, and particularly the urban, vote. The Mixed Urban/Rural System is simple, retains a strong role for political parties and may encourage minority governments and coalitions between parties. It will also increase voter turnout as youth in urban ridings recognize their increasing representation.

It is also important to note the crucial need for popular education about electoral reform.

For more information, see Submission 1418.

Regional Members @ Large. (Lite MMP)

Name: Ray Giza

This proposal ensures representation to most voters by adding a variable number of compensatory members on a regional vote-percentage basis when representation has been denied or seriously deficient based on riding outcomes. The essential features of the current system are maintained including the predominance of single-member ridings, the form of ballot, and the propensity for majority governments.

The unique aspect of the system is the variable number of compensatory seats. Representation is viewed from the perspective of the voter. Rather than fixing the number of legislative seats and then face the daunting task of allocating a small number of seats over a large and diverse electorate - instead, a test of voter strength is prescribed which warrants a seat or seats (regional vote percentage). Compensatory seat award is a clear and simple process.

The system requires viewing 'regions' as something more than arbitrary groups of ridings. When this is accepted, it follows then that the diversity of the vote in each region should have equal opportunity for expression. A region with a more diverse electorate may attain more seats. Although in theory the number of additional members may be excessive in numbers in a given election, statistical analysis renders increasing numbers increasingly improbable.

Other key features of the proposal are the improved opportunity for small and new parties to be successful, equal opportunities for independents to attain a riding or regional seat, and the capability of the electorate to control the height of the bar for majority government.

For more information, see Submission #'s 1056, 1639.

Partisan/Non-Partisan System

Name: Andrew Robertson

Our electoral system needs fairness, in the sense of unbiased, non-partisan representation reflecting the concerns of citizens void Our system also needs proportionality, in the sense of representation not only for individual citizens but also for communities or regions. The current system has some of these principles in place, though not all.

I would like to have a certain percentage of seats held by the typical partisan political candidates who obtain seats based on the total number of votes they receive. I would also like to see a lesser number of seats held by non-partisan candidates who would represent a community or group of communities (like the current riding system).

Each ballot would give the voter two selections, one for your preferred partisan candidate whose party will obtain seats in the house based on the number of votes received and one for your preferred non-partisan candidate, who will represent your community or riding in a fair, non-partisan way in the house.

My proposal offers voters a new choice of electing candidates based not only on overall values and vision for the province but also for representation from their district that does not concern itself with party politics, providing fair and unbiased criticism and acclaim in the house.

My proposal solves the problem of non-proportional representation while also allowing for some local and regional representation where the community and regional issues can be freely debated and meaningfully addressed.

For more information, see Submission 1400.

Section F: Proportional Representation Systems

Proportional Representation with Decisive Election Results (PR-DER)

Name: Dave Potter

The purpose of PR-DER is to overcome the primary problem of PR systems which takes the decision of who forms the government out of the hands of the voters and places it into the hands of the politicians and the parties. PR-DER ensures that the voters' consensus choice of government is elected with enough seats to implement its platform.

PR-DER is similar to MMP except:

- there is a ranked ballot
- the popular vote for the whole province is used for an instant runoff to see which party is the voters' consensus choice of government
- that party gets enough list seats to form a small majority (the remaining list seats are used for proportionality, as with MMP)
- there is no threshold for small parties to be represented (often it is 5% in MMP systems, presumably to facilitate coalition formation and stability- there is no need for that with PR-DER)
- in each riding, the winner is determined by instant runoff.

PR-DER also has a provision for parties to run as coalitions if they wish.

Unlike other forms of PR, PR-DER does not impose politician-chosen coalitions. The voters keep the right to decide who governs, and keep their most effective tool for holding politicians accountable- the ability to grant or deny them the reins of power.

For more information, see Submission 1084.

Really Direct Democracy

Name: Irving R. Silver

The System

The public would make choices on issues of collective action directly through representative samples of the population. This system would eliminate elections in favour of direct public choice on individual issues. This system is reminiscent of Athenian direct democracy, with more contemporary examples including the New England town meeting and the Swiss commune. Our current Westminster Parliamentary system is 800 years old, premised on a population that was largely illiterate and immobile. Universal education, vast improvements in communication technologies and advances in the science and practice of polling combine to make this system possible.

Advantages

The proposed system fulfils the eight principles guiding the work of the Assembly better than any electoral system is likely to do.

Legitimacy: There would be no problems of minority governments, compromise through coalitions, imbalance in voting strength among sub-jurisdictions, etc.

Fairness of representation: Fairness is at the heart of the system. Survey techniques are very accurate. By comparison, the current system can be wildly unfair.

Voter choice: Every adult citizen would be represented in all public decisions and every decision made with knowledge of feasible alternatives.

Effective parties: The main purpose of political parties would shift to convincing the general public of the rightness of their respective points of view.

Stable and effective government: There would be no problem of frequent changes of government because government and the public would be identical.

Effective parliament: There would be no parliament but the people of Ontario.

Stronger voter participation: All adult Ontarians would be eligible, and, from time to time obliged to participate in voter samples, similar to jury duty in the judicial process.

Accountability: Since there would be no elections and no political representatives there would be no problem of political accountability.

Other: The system would be simple and practical, relying on well understood methods of measuring public opinion by using survey techniques. The system would also be transparent.

For more information, see Submission # 1530.

Direct Voting

Name: Sandor Szucs

The main principle missing from discussions of electoral systems is that democracy means governance by people. Electing representatives today is no more democratic than choosing job candidates based on their resumes only.

Modern computerized communication systems allow for direct voting on practically any significant issue the society is interested in.

Day-to-day issues should be governed by officials who tax-payers would elect through entrusting their income tax money for a pre-declared purpose. These elected officials can bring important matters to the attention of voters practically as soon as the problem becomes significant.

This two-level, self-regulated system ensures targeted spending and provides for healthy rotation of local, regional and national governments as well as parliaments, senates and courts every year without the expense of running election campaigns.

The second benefit is that the system ensures the representation of diverse social groups- from very small clubs with special interests to very large groups of people driven by ambitions and ideology, like political parties.

For more information, see Submission 1523.

Riding-Based Proportional Representation

Name: Adam Schneider

This suggestion for riding-based PR is motivated by two main values: local accountability and fairness of representation. Elected members must be responsible to the people for whom they act as a voice, and parties need to be elected to reflect the will of all voters.

Under the proposed system, candidates would compete in each riding and votes for each party are tabulated both by local riding and overall results. As votes for Independents cannot be counted like those for a party, any Independents who won their ridings by the first-past-the-post system are declared elected.

Next, the percentage of the overall vote each party receives determines the number of seats each party will receive. The party with the largest percentage of the vote receives seats in the ridings where they received the greatest percent of the vote. The process continues down to the last place party.

For example, take an Ontario election involving 107 total ridings. After the votes are counted, three Independents are determined to have won their seats under FPTP. 104 seats remain: Party A wins 50% of the popular vote; Party B, 25%; Party C, 20%; and Party D, 5%. Party A thus wins 52 seats; Party B, 26; Party C, 21; and Party D, 5. Party A goes first; they win their top 52 seats based on their percent of the vote in each. Party B wins their top 26 seats, out of the ridings not taken by Party A. Parties C and then D continue in turn, winning their top ridings out of the ridings not yet claimed.

For more information, see Submission 1467.

Proportional Representation by Seat Assignment

Name: Ron Yaraskavitch

Ron Yaraskavitch's System of Proportional Representation by Riding Assignment assigns ridings to seats in the legislature for a party based on the strength of support in a riding for a party.

The procedure is to first determine how many seats each party will have in the legislature based on popular support. For example, 40% popular support for party A means 40 seats for party A in a 100 seat legislature, etc.

Second, take the party that received the most popular support and start assigning a riding to a seat in the legislature by starting with the riding that has the highest percentage support for that party. So the riding that has the highest percentage support for party A will be the first riding assigned to a seat in the legislature for party A.

Keep assigning ridings to seats for that party by choosing the riding that has the highest percentage support for that party out of all the remaining ridings until that party has the number of seats it is allowed. So the riding that has the second highest percentage support for party A will be the second riding assigned to a seat for party A.

This means that parties will have elected representatives in ridings where the party has the strongest support. Further, the number of seats in the legislature represents that party's popular support.

Finally, do the same for all the other parties where you first assign ridings to seats for the most popular parties, leaving riding assignments for the least popular party to the last.

Politically divided ridings (where support for the other parties is very low) would be the ridings that tend to be assigned to the party with the lowest popular support. This understanding allows a party to be assigned seats for ridings even though the least popular party did not "win" a riding, but had enough popular support to warrant having seats in the legislature.

This system will also leave the focus of election campaigns on the ridings.

For more information, see Submission #'s 1440, 1449, 1617, 1618.

Modified P.R.

Name: E.J. (Ted) Legg

I do not believe that the present system reflects the true majority opinion of voters. Too many Governments get into power with only a minority of the population supporting them.

Every voter's vote (within reason) should count in the final result. Further, persons being elected should represent the person casting the vote and should not come from some backroom Party generated List.

I support a system of proportional representation with a 5% threshold those seeking election must surpass in order to avoid frivolous candidates and an excess of candidates.

I would like to suggest the following system:

- a) - All nominated candidates for all running Parties continue as present (ie: they get nominated and run in their electoral district);
- b) - Voters vote for candidates as they presently do;
- c) - ALL candidates running in Ontario are then sorted by the number of votes received, with the candidates receiving the highest percentage of votes placed at the top of the list. This sorting would be done for each legitimate Party or Independent category.
- d) – For example, if the Liberals get 45% of the popular vote; the Conservatives get 30% of the popular vote; the NDP gets 20% of the popular vote; and the Green Party gets 5% of the popular vote, then all the top candidates totaling each of their Party's overall Ontario popular vote percentage would be deemed elected - ie: working from the top down, the Liberals would get number of candidates totally 45% of the popular vote and so on for each Party/Independent.

While not every electoral district would get their top choice, many would and, in the overall scheme of things, the Province will be governed by people who more closely reflect the preferences of the population.

For more information, see Submission 1150.

The Ultimate Electoral System

Name: Jacques Moul

Most of the problems in current system revolve around the question of how to translate votes into seats. This system recognises that votes are the true deciding factor in elections and much simpler to manipulate than seats.

This recognition provides the means to introduce a perfect Democratic Electoral System, where all votes are counted and reflect the preferences of the electorate.

Parties will still elect their riding candidates the same as they have done in the past, with one vote per qualified voter. However, the popular votes of parties are represented proportionally.

This system introduces a process providing a second chance for voters who supported a candidate who failed to get elected. The process is controlled by a threshold figure which would be determined ahead of time by the Chief Electoral Officer. Parties receiving a popular vote below the threshold would transfer their votes to the party which they designated before the election.

Some people are concerned that Proportional Representation would induce minority or coalition governments which may slow down the business of the House or Legislative Assemblies. There is no justification to expect such problems. Indeed, slowdowns may be caused by the fiercely competitive nature of the current system.

For more information, see Submission 1573.

Section G: Reconceptualising Representation

Gender-Based Constituencies

Name: James Decandole

The legislature of Ontario is a representative body. The population of the province is divided into constituencies and the citizens of each constituency chose one of their numbers to represent them as a member of the legislature. The constituencies are geographical and one's residence determines one's constituency.

In relation to the demographic characteristics of the population of Ontario, under the current system some groups are over-represented and others are under-represented. The membership of the legislature is over-representative of men, rural and northern residents as well as the old. Women, urban residents and the young are under-represented.

The inability of our electoral system to provide equal representation to the female half of the population, in particular, is a very serious problem. Attempts by political parties to increase the number of women elected to the legislature by means of nomination procedures or quotas have thus far proved to be inadequate.

This is a proposal to address this failure of democracy by *changing our definition of constituency*. Accordingly, the population of Ontario shall be divided by both residence and gender. A geographical constituency shall be further divided into male and female constituencies. Thus, each group- men and women- shall have a separate voters' list, shall nominate candidates and shall elect one of them as their member of the legislature.

The under-representation of the younger half of the population has not, as yet, become a significant political issue. If it does, the creation of age-based constituencies could address the problem. However, such a division would be complicated and may not be practical.

For more information, see Submission # 1464.

Gender/Geographical Representation (GGR)

Name: Dave Potter

The purpose of GGR is to achieve full and immediate political equality for women. It does this by giving both women and men the same strong representation that regions now enjoy. Gender equality would be a winning strategy for the parties, just as regional equality is now.

For example, under STV half of the multi-member ridings would consist of female voters and half of male voters. Two of the ridings might be "Women of Toronto" and "Men of Toronto". The longer submission referenced below provides details of how GGR would work under STV, MMP, PR-DER, List PR and SMD.

GGR would provide three types of equality:

- A gender-balanced legislature (just as the parties now usually run local residents as candidates, so they would usually run women in women's ridings);
- Equal stature within the parties (just as regional leaders are now key players because of the role they play in winning seats in their regions, so women would be key players because of their role in winning women's ridings);
- Effective representation for women as voters, not just fairness for women in the parties (women's MPPs would be accountable to women alone).

Other approaches to achieving equality for women- i.e., PR and/or quotas- have not achieved gender-balanced legislatures in other countries (35% is typical), and do not address the other two types of equality. Fresh thinking, such as GGR, is required.

For more information, see Submission 1448.

Demographic Representation in the Ontario Legislature

Name: Bryan Kerman

It is argued that certain demographic groups amongst the general population are either too scattered, or too inexperienced to have a share of power that their numbers warrant. This proposed focuses on ways to increase the representation of Ontario natives, as well as youth, in the Legislature.

The idea is to establish 'self-organizing constituencies' (SOC's) which elect their own members, similar to electing a riding representative. That is, natives elect a native member from among native party candidates to the Legislature.

Some basic rules apply:

- a. About 80,000 qualified signed-up people are needed to form a SOC;
- b. Only qualified persons can become members (eg., have a native status card);
- c. There is no obligation to join;
- d. There can be no compulsion or financial incentive to join;
- e. A SOC member is free to withdraw at any time and vote in a riding;
- f. Party candidates must be allowed to stand for office in a SOC;
- g. A SOC is not a party and will explicitly be denied party status.

The rules of qualification are proposed by the organizers of a SOC (say the Chiefs of Ontario) and presented for approval to the Legislature. It must be noted that New Zealand currently has such an arrangement for the Maori. Further, the idea of special seats for natives has been discussed at the Ontario cabinet level.

A second demographic group for which there are existing precedents for special entry into decision making bodies is our youth. There are about 1 million Ontario youth between 18 and 25 years old whose affairs are entirely decided by non-youth members of the Legislature. Again, there are numerous precedents for including youth- for example, including students on college and university boards.

The inclusion of other underrepresented groups, such as the unemployed, could be given consideration in the future.

For more information, see Submission #'s 1477, 1136, 1045.

The People-Land Democracy

Name: Yves Villeneuve

The People-Land Democracy effectively represents both urban and rural districts recognizing the fact that population and the environment, or Humans and Earth, are equal within our planet. Land area, the environment and Earth are defined as Food, or everything above and below the surface of the planet with the exception of the human population, the Hunter.

When the People-Land Democracy is applied, the new legislative vote value for the district equals: [(district population / provincial population) + (district land area / provincial land area)] divided by 2.

The vote value of a district would be described as: one person equals one population vote, one acre of land equals one environment vote and provincial population votes (50%) equal provincial environment votes (50%).

In my layman's opinion, the Canadian Constitution Act requires a member of a district to be elected on the basis of one person equals one vote. However, there seems to be constitutional freedom in allowing a member and a district the freedom to proportionally represent in the legislature the member *and* the district in terms of both People and Land; or, population and environment.

The People-Land Democracy is considered to be the last major step in attaining true democracy by automatically balancing and representing the interests of two equals: the population and the environment.

In closing, the long term effects when applying the People-Land premise in democratic decision making is to decrease or eliminate the incidence and intensity of crisis on our planet affecting the population and the environment.

For more information, see Submission #'s 1581, 1081, 1035, 1033, 1020, 1015, 1007.

Section H: New Systems

CTESS

Name: Chris Twardawa

It was in 1993 that Christopher Twardawa first started looking into various electoral systems. Realizing that they all had trade-offs and not a single one of them was perfect, he set out to create an electoral system that would not have a single deficiency or flaw.

It was in 2003 that he finally achieved his goal and named the result CTESS - the Christopher Twardawa Electoral System Solution. Unlike any other electoral system currently used, CTESS has no trade-offs and compared to any other system other than the status quo, it is the easiest one to adapt to Ontario.

Bluntly put, CTESS takes Ontario's current SMP system and adapts it to the reality of Ontario in 2007 as Ontario has greatly evolved since 1792, the year Ontario's first elected parliament.

The CTESS is devised in a 5-step mechanism and once the process is completed, the results of any general elections would not just meet but exceed the values sought by the Ontario Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform.

Furthermore, CTESS lists deficiencies of the SMP system and backs these up with results of recent elections. CTESS also exposes the undesirable consequences of minority and coalition governments which clearly are detrimental to citizens as a whole.

The CTESS report can be read at www.ctess.ca.

For more information, see Submission 1756.

Personally Accountable Representation

Name: Sol Erdman

Neither STV nor Mixed Member Systems would win more than 60% public support in an Ontario referendum. Both systems have major stumbling blocks.

STV can be hard to understand. Most voters don't know exactly which representatives are accountable to them. Mixed systems have similar drawbacks, where list representatives are not seen as accountable and the voters feel disenfranchised.

There is, however, a method that could win overwhelming public support. It creates a stronger bond between each voter and his or her representative than any election system now in use. This new method is called Personally Accountable Representation, or PAR.

In a PAR election, each voter ends up with one representative: one representative who shares the voter's own political values, one representative whom each voter can truly hold accountable.

Overall, PAR would come closer than other systems to achieving six of the core principles that the Citizens' Assembly is striving so hard to meet: accountability, legitimacy, fairness, voter choice, voter participation and effective parliament

For more information, see Submission 1184.

Rotating By-Elections

Name: Des Emery

The present method of "first past the post" was originally quite fair and effective, but parties have proliferated over the past hundred years and we now have to pick one of several nominees to represent us. "Proportional Representation" is touted as the best way to get everyone some representation in parliament, but that will lead inevitably to "opinion" overload and will not serve Canadians.

The composition of parliament, once elected, gives us a clue to how we should go about re-electing the different members. We would see more participation by the public if their concerns were to be addressed sooner rather than later, and their trust was placed in those elected instead of the people behind "the throne." That would be accomplished if one-fifth or one-sixth of the parliament was replaced in by-elections held annually.

Each year would see by-elections in some of the ridings, selected once by random choice by the Speaker until a rotation was established. Each riding then would be represented by one person for five years but the government itself would survive on the results of the annual by-elections, retaining power if the public generally approved of the progress achieved within the year, or being ejected if earning public disapproval. Back-benchers would become more influential and the costs of province-wide elections would be reduced. There would be no "general election" called but members would always be kept on their toes, satisfying voters.

The choice of candidates should be modeled on the method of run-off elections by which leaders of parties are selected. Minor or inconsequential candidates would be eliminated quickly and would throw their support behind another candidate for the following ballot procedures- ultimately producing a majority and more accurately reflecting the voters preferences.

Benefits of this rotational system would include reduced number of fringe candidates, increased voter participation, parliamentary responsibility, lessened interference by third parties, and increased interest by the public in politics.

For more information, see Submission 1302.